By Ben Cope
The truth is we simply don’t know how to boost birthrates in modern, liberal countries. But we do know that immigration can reverse demographic decline, says Ben Cope
Britain is rapidly resembling a geriatric ward. The buildings are old and crumbly, the institutions even more so, and the people… well, they’re starting to get on a bit.
The cause? Britain’s fertility rate has been below replacement levels – 2.1 children per woman – since the early 1970s and is continuing to fall (currently at 1.49). At this rate, the native population will soon peak and then atrophy. Britain will become a land of pensioners, with nearly a quarter of the population being over 65 by 2035.
For over 20 years, Westminster’s solution has been immigration – bringing in young workers to offset our demographic decline. But no more. Record levels of immigration in recent years has destroyed politicos’ pro-immigration consensus, leaving them casting around for alternatives. Natalism – policies aimed at increasing the birth rate – is now in vogue.
This is a good thing. Reversing anti-child and anti-parent policies will boost our economy and wellbeing. The trouble is that it won’t boost fertility rates. To avoid demographic collapse, immigration will need to remain high. The challenge is to make it popular enough so that voters don’t undermine it. And the solution? Make culture central.
But for Britain’s new natalists, this is a non-starter. City A.M. columnist Phoebe Arslanagić-Little and Anvar Sarygulov’s popular new Substack post, ‘Sorry – immigration isn’t the solution’, cites modelling suggesting that maintaining a “reasonable” dependency ratio between workers and pensioners would require annual net immigration to start at 500,000 and rise over time, leading to 37 per cent of the country being foreign-born by 2083, up from 15 per cent today.
For Arslanagić-Little and Sarygulov, this is unfeasible. They say falling fertility rates in other Western nations means Britain will run out of willing, high-skilled immigrants. And that democratic consent for high immigration – particularly of low-skilled workers – will dissipate long before then, if it hasn’t already.
Now, some of the natalist policies they advocate for instead are sensible. Reducing housing and childcare costs would boost economic activity and improve living standards, as would greater access to flexible work. It’s also encouraging that the more sinister Handmaid’s-tale themed policies advocated bysome natalists have remained fringe.
The trouble is that they won’t increase the birth rate. There’s a naïve assumption that the baby bust is a British phenomenon, that can be solved by fixing our idiosyncratic failings like housing, rather than a global one. Every developed country – bar Israel – has a fertility rate below replacement levels, as well as many developing countries such as India, Vietnam and Brazil.
Several of these countries are putting natalist policies into practice, but to no avail. Despite its expensive natalist programme, Hungary’s fertility rate still tracks neighbouring countries, while childcare costs have no correlation to births. The only natalist ‘policy’ we know that works is religion (see the fertility recovery in Uzbekistan, for example). We simply don’t know how to boost birth rates in modern, liberal societies. Natalism isn’t a practical solution to an ageing population.
But immigration is. Firstly, we know how to do it. We already are. And secondly, tales of a shortage of immigrants are overplayed. High living standards, the English language, and an international culture mean Britain will remain a highly desirable destination. Andimmigration-experts don’t predict globally falling fertility rates to significantly affect the availability of skilled immigrants this century (who can come from countries with higher fertility rates as well).
The challenge – as Arslanagić-Little and Sarygulov identify – is democratic consent. The public’s relationship with immigration is complex, but on the whole, they don’t like it. UKIP, Brexit, Reform, and indeed the Conservatives: voters have repeatedly chosen those who promise to cut immigration. The current strategy of increasing immigration through the backdoor withstudent visas, and skilled visas for social carers and teachers, undermines trust and is ultimately untenable.
But the solution isn’t to blindly follow public opinion. Instead, we should change it. To transform Britain into a country supportive of the levels of immigration it requires, culture needs to take centre stage. Until now, that immigrants from different countries have different cultures which affects how they assimilate has been taboo, despite the public intuitively understanding it. Sweeping this reasonable concern under the carpet has given undue legitimacy to racist far right politics.
In practice, worker visas should operate on a tiered points-based system, whereby immigrants from more culturally similar countries require fewer points to enter. Countries would be regularly sorted by a list of metrics, such as GDP per capita, support for democracy and attitudes towards women.
This system would have flaws. Clearly, not everyone in a country holds the same values. But the advantage of the points-based system is that individuals could enter from any country provided they meet the threshold.
That the scale of the challenge Britain’s ageing population poses is starting to loom over Westminster is welcome (even if it hasn’t filtered through into mainstream politics yet). But we must resist the pull of unrealistic silver bullets. Natalism doesn’t work. Immigration does and can in the future. We just need to change it a bit.
Ben Cope is a political commentator and communications professional
