When Comparing The Ukraine And Gaza Wars Makes Sense — And When It Doesn't

BEIRUT — After the cross-border attack by Hamas on Israel on Oct. 7 and Israel’s subsequent bombardment campaign on the Palestinian militant group in Gaza, French media and academia began comparing the war in the Palestinian enclave to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

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The interest in the two wars appeared logical in France given their repercussions.

The war in Ukraine has had its economic and social repercussions in France, as well as creating security concerns in the wider continent.

But despite ties between some French political parties and Moscow, the Ukraine war has not created the same amount of political polarization as the war in Gaza. This is understandable since France is home to some of Europe's largest Jewish and Arab communities.

Three categories

There are three types of comparisons that are being drawn — mainly based on the geopolitical situation, and not on local the repercussions of the two wars.

The first category views the two conflicts in the context of the clash of civilizations. Those who draw this comparison argue that the "Ukrainian and Israeli democracies" were attacked. Therefore, Ukraine and Israel are in a state of legitimate self-defense against terrorism. The main targets, they argue, are the West and its democratic values.

Political leaders themselves are trying to use these comparisons in their own favor.

The second category includes those who oppose the United States and side with Russia and the Palestinians. This group attempts to put Russia on equal footing with the Palestinians. They argue that the conflicts didn’t start on with Hamas's attack on Oct. 7, 2023 and with the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 22, 2022.

According to this argument, the Russian invasion of Ukraine came after Moscow had exhausted all diplomatic means to prevent Ukraine's attacks against Russian citizens in the east of the country — and they resorted to military force to protect their Russian enclaves.

The third category sides with the Ukrainians and the Palestinians — viewing both as victims of aggressions. They put Russia and Israel in the same box.

Destruction of Residential Towers in Bureij.

Comparing wars is natural

Bertrand Badie, professor emeritus at the Center for International Studies At Sciences Po, in Paris, said that a comparison between the wars is necessary, but it should be done accurately.

He argued that the diversity of comparisons is additional evidence of the current “subjectivity” of international relations — unlike the situation in the Cold War era, when the world had a less complicated model of international relations.

You can choose to look at the two wars as precursors of a future world order.

According to Badie, the third category is the most coherent. Their argument is based on the classification of "strong" and "weak" countries, while the two other categories reflect emotional aspects such as aversion to the United States or favoring Zionism.

Political leaders themselves are trying to use these comparisons in their own favor.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has exploited the media focus on the ongoing war in Gaza and the diplomatic efforts to end it — attempting to weaken its detractors by emphasizing the West’s double standards in terms of international law and war crimes.

Ukraine received a share of that indirect comparison, albeit to a lesser extent, after President Volodymyr Zelensky declared his solidarity with Israel, a position interpreted as an attempt to consolidate and confirm his position within the Western camp.

Badie argues that comparing conflicts over their mutual impact is possible and common for three reasons. The first is that we don’t live in self-isolated nations, and that each conflict has its own international dimensions. The second reason is a strategic one — national leaders naturally seek to capitalize on any conflict by turning its outcome in their countries' favor.

The third reason, according to Badie, is sociological: each person or segment of society has their own main conflict from which they form their opinion towards other conflicts. According to Badie’s analysis, the solidarity of the Syrian opposition with Ukraine was in part because of their anti-Putin stance.

People are seen by a residential house damaged after a military strike by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the rural town of Staromikhailovka.

A shift in geopolitcs

Certain French journalists chose to look at the two wars as precursors of a future world order.

In an article published in L’Express daily last October, Cyrille Pluyette wrote that the world is in a dangerous tipping point after the Ukraine war showed the rift between the West and the rest of the world, and the conflict in the Middle East has widened that gap.

Pluyette pointed at efforts by China, Russia and Iran to weaken the United States and increase their influence in the countries that are wary about the West.

We know what was before it but we do not know what will come after it.

Columnist Alain Frachon, meanwhile, wrote in Le Monde in November that the wars in Europe and the Middle East reflect “an international landscape that is fragmented, divided and antagonistic — and therefore largely powerless.”

“There is no 'international community' capable of promoting or imposing a resolution,” he said in his article titled “Wars in Ukraine and Gaza: 'Today, no international community is capable of imposing a resolution'”.

He said that this situation has been exploited by China and Russia to denounce “the U.S. (or Western) 'hegemony' over the international system handed down from 1945.”

Both China and Russia aim to “weaken the U.S. and shape the system in a direction more favorable to the interests of Moscow and Beijing.”

A new world order

Badie agrees that we are living through a turning shift at the level of world order, but it is difficult to predict what exactly this new system entails.

The absence of a clear name for the current geopolitical context is evidence enough of that lack of insight. Academics just call it the "post-bipolar system.” We know what was before it but we do not know what will come after it.

"We must wait a decade or two to fully understand the impact of the war in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip in shaping the awaited world order,” Badie said.

In April, renowned Egyptian columnist Gamil Matter wrote in al-Shorouk daily that the world is in a transition period, which he called “the decline of the American hegemony.”

“The world is in trouble, and our Arab world is part of it,” Matter, who is a former diplomat, wrote. “Both of them are in the process of moving to something else whose boundaries, form, conditions, or values are not yet known.”